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JUDICIAL NOTICE-EXCERPTS RELATING TO
THE MORGAN-WIGMORE CONTROVERSY
JOHN T. McNAUGHTON*

[Author's Note. These two excerpts are from the author's
preliminary draft of his proposed revision of the judicial
notice chapter of Wigmore on Evidence. The excerpts are
submitted for publication in this Edmund M. Morgan issue of
the Vanderbilt Law Review for two reasons: First, because of
the important role played by Professor Morgan in the recent
development and articulation of the law of judicial notice and,
second, because Professor Morgan and Dean Wigmore stand
at opposite poles in the argument over judicial notice. At least
they do with respect to one significant particular.
They do not differ with respect to the application of the
doctrine to "law." Nor do they reveal a difference with respect
to so-called "jury notice." Their difference relates to judicial
notice of "facts." Here Wigmore, following Thayer, insists
that judicial notice is solely to save time where dispute is
unlikely and that a matter judicially noticed is therefore only
"prima facie," or rebuttable, if the opponent elects to dispute
it. It is express in Thayer and implicit in Wigmore that (perhaps because the matter is rebuttable) judicial notice may be
applied not only to indisputable matters but also to matters
of lesser certainty. Morgan on the other hand defines judicial
notice more narrowly, and his consequences follow from his
definition. He limits judicial notice of fact to matters patently
indisputable. And his position is that matters judicially
noticed are not rebuttable. He asserts that it is wasteful to
permit patently indisputable matters to be litigated by way
of formal proof and furthermore that it would be absurd to
permit a party to woo a jury to an obviously erroneous finding
contrary to the noticed fact. Also, he objects to the Wigmorean conception on the ground that it is really a "presumption" of sorts attempting to pass under a misleading name.
It is, according to Morgan, a presumption with no recognized
rules as to how the presumption works-what activates it and
who has the burden of doing how much to rebut it.
The reader will notice that the following draft revision,
while presenting Wigmore's position in textual insert or footnote, adopts Morgan's'point of view. This change is made
*
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reluctantly. The reluctance stems in part from a suspicion
that the best chance of progress in the tangle of presumptions,
burdens of proof and judicial notice may lie in the misunderstanding of judicial notice. That is, Wigmore's "judicial
notice" could, if elaborated by a misunderstanding court, be
applied to matters not indisputable enough to qualify for
Morgan's judicial notice and might be a significant contribution to the law of presumptions and burdens of proof. Whatever added publicity is given by this revision of the treatise
to the fallaciousness of Wigmore's position and to the impregnability of Morgan's position will make it that much
more difficult for courts to indulge in this creative mistake.]
§ 2565.

THEORY OF JUDICIAL NOTICE1

Of the multifarious propositions essential to the resolution of a
dispute before a legal tribunal, proof by formal evidence is dispensed
§ 2565.

1. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 2565 (3d ed. 1940).

(the following two

paragraphs comprise the entire section): "Theory of Judicial Notice. Of the
propositions involved in the pleadings, or relevant thereto, proof by evidence
may be dispensed with in two situations: (1) where the opponent by a solemn
or infra-judicial admission has waived dispute, and (2) where the Court is
justified by general considerations in declaring the truth of the proposition
without requiring evidence from the party. The former is considered under
the head of Judicial Admissions (post, §§ 2588-2596). The latter is the process
most commonly meant by the term Judicial Notice.
'"There are various senses in which the term Judicial Notice is used. In the
orthodox sense above noted, it signifies that there are certain 'facta probanda'
(ante, § 2), or propositions in a party's case, as to which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal without
the need of evidence. This general principle of Judicial Notice is simple and
natural enough."
See the following authorities: 9 HoLDsWoRTH, A HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW
135-39 (1926); MAGUiRE, EVIDENcE--CoMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 167-75

(1947); THAYER, A PRELIMnvINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
277-312 (1898); Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1949); Davis,
Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945 (1955); Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense
and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664 (1950); McCormick,
Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REV. 296 (1952); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV.
L. REV. 269 (1944); Nokes, The Limits of Judicial Notice, 74 L.Q. REV. 59
(1958) (surveying the English law of the subject); Strahorn, The Process of
JudicialNotice, 14 VA. L. REV. 544 (1928).
See also UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 9-12, quoted below. These rules are
broader than MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 801-06 (1942) in that (1) judicial
notice must be taken without request, rather than on request, (a) of the
common law and public statutes of other jurisdictions of the United States,
and (b) of specific facts universally known to be true, and (2) judicial notice
may, rather than may not, be taken of the laws of foreign countries. (3) Uniform Rule 11, according to the comment, "goes a little farther than Model
Code Rule 805 in that it requires the judge to specify not only facts which
he notices judicially but also his findings with respect to foreign laws, municipal ordinances and the like." (4) Uniform Rule 10 (4) has no counterpart in
the Model Code and, if the other rules are read sympathetically, is superfluous:
"Rule 9. Facts Which Must or May Be Judicially Noticed. (1) Judicial
notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the common law, con-
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with in two situations. First, where the parties in some manner agree
to the truth of the proposition, thus removing it entirely from controversy, and, second, where the court is justified by general considerations in ascertaining the truth of propositions by methods other
than through the formal reception of evidence. 2 The former-under
stitutions and public statutes in force in every state, territory and jurisdiction
of the United States, and of such specific facts and propositions of generalized
knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the
subject of dispute. (2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a
party, of (a) private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States
and of the legislature of this state, and duly enacted ordinances and duly
published regulations of governmental subdivisions or agencies of this state,
and (b) the laws of foreign countries, and (c)such facts as are so generally
known or of such common notoriety within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute, and (d) specific
facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of
indisputable accuracy. (3) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in paragraph (2) of this rule if a party requests it and (a) furnishes the
judge sufficient information to enable him properly to comply with the request
and (b) has given each adverse party such notice as the judge may require
to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request.
"Rule 10. Determination as- to Propriety of Judicial Notice and Tenor of
Matter Noticed. (1) The judge shall afford each party reasonable opportunity
to present to him information relevant to the propriety of taking judicial
notice of a matter or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed. (2) In determining the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter or the tenor thereof, (a)
the judge may consult and use any source of pertinent information, whether
or not furnished by a party, and (b) no exclusionary rule except a valid
claim of privilege shall apply. (3) If the information possessed by or readily
available to the judge, whether or not furnished by the parties, fails to convince him that a matter falls clearly within Rule 9, or if it is insufficient to
enable him to notice the matter judicially, he shall decline to take judicial
notice thereof. (4) In any event the determination either by judicial notice
or from evidence of the applicability and the tenor of any matter of common
law, constitutional law, or of any statute, private act, resolution, ordinance or
regulation falling within Rule 9, shall be a matter for the judge and not for
the jury.
"Rule 11. Instructing the Trier of Fact as to Matter Judicially Noticed. If a
matter judicially noticed is other than the common law or constitution or
public statutes of this state, the judge shall indicate for the record the matter
which is judicially noticed and if the matter would otherwise have been for
determination by a trier of fact other than the judge, he shall instruct the
trier of the fact to accept as a fact the matter so noticed.
"Rule 12. JudicialNotice in ProceedingsSubsequent to Trial. (1) The failure
or refusal of the judge to take judicial notice of a matter, or to instruct the
trier of fact with respect to the matter, shall not preclude the judge from
taking judicial notice of the matter in subsequent proceedings in the action.
(2) The rulings of the judge under Rules 9, 10 and 11 are subject to review.
(3) The reviewing court in its discretion may take judicial notice of any
matter specified in Rule 9 whether or not judicially noticed by the judge.
(4) A judge or a reviewing court taking judicial notice under Paragraph (1)
or (3) of this rule of matter not theretofore so noticed in the action shall
afford the parties reasonable opportunity to present information relevant to
the propriety of taking such judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter to
be noticed."
2. Throughout this discussion of judicial notice, if confusion is to be minimized, it is essential that the word "evidence" be defined carefully and used
consistently. It is essential to guard against using the word, as a layman
would, to mean any kind of "information," without regard for the way in
which it is received by the tribunal. 'Evidence," as here used, means that
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the head of judicial admissions-is considered infra §§ 2588-2596. The
latter is here considered under the omnibus term judicial notice.
1. What is judicial notice?-The expression "judicial notice" is of
obscure origin. Bentham discusses the subject in his works written
'3
between 1802 and 1812 but does not use the phrase "judicial notice.
A variation of it appears, perhaps for the first time, in the sideheads
of a treatise by Starkie in 1824:4 "Matters judicially noticed." His
running head reads, "Matters Noticed by the Court." His text, however, contains no similar phrase. It seems obvious, as pointed out by
Thayer, that the word "notice" in the present context connotes not
casual observing or remarking or being aware of, as the word implies
in popular usage today, but rather knowledge or the archaic legal
term, carrying the same implication, conusance.5 It sometimes carries
an imputation of chargeabilitywith knowledge, a meaning still attributed to the word "notice" in the law.
Whatever may be the vintage of the name, it is clear that the principle of judicial notice is ancient. Bracton reported the maxim over
information which is received by the trier of fact in its capacity as such, subject to the so-called formal rules of evidence-traditional rules as to burdens
of proof, authentication, competency, oath, cross-examination, hearsay, opinion, best evidence and so on. The significance of this definition of "evidence,"
as will be developed in text, is that "evidence" and "judicial notice" (though
not strictly parallel terms) are complementary: That which is proved by
evidence is not judicially noticed, and that which is judicially noticed is not
proved by evidence.
3. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827), in 6 THE WORKS OF
JEREm-y BENTHAM 276-78 (Bowring ed. 1843). Bentham suggested at 278, that
in cases of matters notoriously true, the proponent be required to prove the
fact only if the opponent not only demanded proof but declared that he disbelieved the fact (under "burthen of punishment, or... satisfaction, or both");
he continued that "shame,-fear of disrepute, will in general be sufficient to
prevent any such call from being made, in a case in which the declaration, if
made, would be otherwise than sincere . .. ." Bentham's proposal is not far
from that involved in an unreasonable refusal to admit a fact requested under
FED. R. CIv. P. 36, described in note 9 infra.
4. 1 STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 400 (1824).
In a related (perhaps ancestral) context-distinguishing general acts of
Parliament (where "the printed Statute Book is Evidence") and private acts
of Parliament (where "the printed Statute Book is not Evidence")-the word
"notice" was used a century earlier. GLBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENcE 10, 12
(1756). Gilbert (at 12-13) justified the different treatment accorded the two
kinds of statutes on the ground that "no Man is understood to be possess'd
of them [private statutes], as they are of those general Laws ....

Private

Statutes are no Intimation to what is already known, but they are the Rules
and Degrees that relate to the Private Fortune of this or that particular Man,
which no one else is under any Obligation [13] to understand or take Notice
of . . . . [Tihey are not considered as already lodged in the Minds of the
People." (Emphasis added.) According to Professor Morgan, Gilbert's work
was written before 1726. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 182 n.5 (1948).
5. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 278
n.1 (1898). The practice was discussed under the heading of "judicial cognisance" by Coleridge, J., in Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216, 267, 118 Eng.
Rep. 749, 768 (1853).
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seven centuries ago: ea que manifesta sunt, non indigent probacione
("that which is obvious need not be proved").6 Application of the
principle to a fact was reported in the Year Books over six centuries
ago. 7 Propriety of the principle in some sense cannot be doubted.
Unfortunately, however, the term judicial notice is used in a number
of senses. It is used to convey not one, but at least three conceptions
or emphases.
(a) Ad hoc presumption.-In one of its uses, "judicial notice" embodies the notion that, where a matter essential to a party's case is
probably true (or for any reason is unlikely to be disputed), the
matter may be assumed, conditionally, to be true.8 That is, the judge
has at his disposal a device for assigning a burden of proof (or of
"challenge"?) to the other party. In essence, judicial notice, according
to this view, has many characteristics of an ad hoc presumption.
Proponents of this view obviously dissent from the position taken
in paragraph 2(b) infra that judicial notice is limited to matters
indisputably true. And they accordingly dissent from the principle of
§ 2567 infra that judicial notice is "conclusive"; they would allow the
party against whom judicial notice operates to demand formal proof
of, or at least to disprove by formal evidence, the matter noticed.
This position reflects a justifiable impatience with the inflexibility
of the exclusionary rules of evidence and of the rules as to burdens
of proof (including presumptions). It is a cry, out of frustration, for
liberation from the costly and time-consuming formality of proof
under the rules of evidence in those instances where dispute is
unlikely. Trial procedure might be less an object of derision if the
9
law, before now, had fully elaborated a device of this kind. But the
6. 2 Bracton's N.B., case 194 (1222) (marginal notation).
7. Y.B. 30 & 31 Edw. I (R.S.) 256-59 (1302).
8. See the authorities cited in4ra § 2567, note 1.
9. UN

ooRm RULE OF EVIDENCE 3 (following MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 3
represent a

(1942)) contains an interesting and novel provision which may

concession to the need expressed in the text above. Rule 3 is not one of the
judicial notice sections (all of which appear in note 1 supra). It applies not
to matters patently indisputable but rather to disputable matters as to which
"there is no bona fide dispute." The proposed rule provides: "If upon the
hearing there is no bona fide dispute between the parties as to a material
fact, such fact may be proved by any relevant evidence, and exclusionary
rules shall not apply, subject, however, to Rule 45 [(discretionary exclusion
of inordinately time-consuming, prejudicial, confusing and surprising evidence)] and any valid claim of privilege." The Comment to the Model Code
rule states: "This Rule applies to matters of evidence the principle which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... make applicable to matters of substance
in their provisions for pre-trial procedure and for summary judgment. To
permit parties to insist upon a strict observance of the rules of evidence or
procedure in the proof of formal matters and of evidentiary facts as to the
truth of which there is no dispute is to impose unnecessary expense upon
litigants and the public."
The reference in the Comment to "pre-trial procedure" is not to FED. R. Civ.
P. 16, which bears the title, "Pre-trial procedure; formulating issues." That
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principle has not been elaborated. The necessary details are missing.
While a strong and imaginative judge (especially if there is no jury)
might be able to administer the unelaborated principle fairly and
effectively, it is too sketchy for general application. Until parties can
know just what kind of a showing requires or permits the judge to
"notice" a fact and what sort of burden this shifts onto the adversary
(to challenge, to produce some disputing evidence, to disprove), the
conception is impracticable. 10 It therefore must be rejected as
anomalous.
(b) "Chargeability" of the judge.-The term judicial notice is also
sometimes used to convey the thought that the court is "chargeable"
with knowledge. That is, it imports that primary responsibility for
obtaining (or having) certain information relevant to decision rests
not with the parties but with the judge. Typically, "judicial notice"
is used in this sense when the relevant information is domestic public
law, but it is sometimes used in this sense when the information is
facts notoriously and indisputably true. If a court is truly "chargerule provides for the informal pre-trial conference, but gives the judge no
power to remove issues from the area of formal proof. Rather, the reference
is presumably to FED. R. Civ. P. 36, 37(c). These rules prescribe a procedure
for obtaining admissions of relevant matters of fact and for imposing the
cost of proof on the opponent who capriciously denies the fact. The reference
to "summary judgment" is to FED. R. Civ. P. 56. That rule provides that, on
proper motion, "[tlhe [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The
rule continues, however, that "[slupporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein."
It thus appears that, while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe
procedures at the pre-trial stage which are substantially at variance with the
formal rules of evidence and which preclude ultimate resort to formal evidence when the issue is not genuinely in dispute, they do not go as far as
Uniform Rule 3 in empowering the judge to admit all unprivileged information.
The reception given this rule by the supreme court committee and by the
legislative commission in New Jersey is illuminating. The court committee,
after discussing the pros and cons, concluded: "It is novel, but the goals are
clearly desirable." REPORT Or THE COMLUTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE LAW
or EVIDENCE TO THE SUPREME COURT or NEW JERsEY 6 (May 25, 1955). The
legislative commission, without explanatory comment, simply added this
emasculatory sentence: "This rule shall not apply when (a) a party requires
his opponent to prove any material fact needed to establish a claim or
defense or (b) a party has reserved the right to object to the admissibility
of evidence although stipulating the truth of the fact."
10. On this point, see Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REV. 269, 286
(1944). If the Wigmore-Thayer device were made practicable, by legislation
or elaborating decisions, it would seem wise to call it something other than
"judicial notice"-a term already burdened with content of a very different
kind. It is, after all, a device quite suitably described by the term "presumption."
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able" with knowledge of a matter, it follows that the court must take
judicial notice without request by the party." (Of course, even here
the allocation of responsibility to the judge is not unqualified. The
judge may solicit the aid of counsel in his effort to get correct information, and the principle of invited error may apply to penalize a
party who knowingly or carelessly misleads or fails to assist the judge
in his function.)
It should be discerned that the emphasis in this second use of the
term is useful provided one does not draw from it the unwarranted
negative inference that judicial notice may not be taken of matters
of which the judge is not "chargeable" with knowledge. For judicial
notice is frequently and properly taken of additional matters-for
example, those which the judge may notice, and those which he must
notice only upon request and upon being provided adequate information by the party (§ 2568 infra). A judge is frequently permitted
on his own initiative to notice, for example, foreign law and facts
indisputably true but which enjoy only local notoriety or which require resort to some reference book; and the judge is required to
notice such matters, if at all, only if he is asked to do so and is2 provided with the necessary supporting informal information.'
(c) Informality of proof.-The name judicial notice creates an
image of a third concept as well. The third, rather than emphasizing
11. See, e.g., UNIFORm RULE

OF EVIDENCE

9(1), quoted in note 1 supra. For

decisions involving judicial notice, in this sense, of applicable law, see Lilly v.
Grand Trunk W. R.R., 317 U.S. 481, 488 (1943), and Hoyt v. Russell, 117 U.S.
401 (1886). In the Lilly case, the state court trying an FELA case, although
not requested to do so, was required to notice an ICC rule, which was held to
be an "integral part of the [federal Boiler Inspection] Act.

. .

." In the Hoyt

case, the Court stated that the trial court was "bound to know whether they
[the laws of the territory] were in force in the township" in question. Cases
in which the trial judge, though not requested to do so, was reversed for
failure to notice a fact are rare. One such case, Mills v. Denver Tramway
Corp., 155 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946), so held and was criticized in 60 HARv. L.
REV. 299 (1946).
Several state statutes require the court to notice certain facts as well as
law. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1875 (Deering 1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
9-101 (1948); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:422 (1951); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.

§ 93-501-1 (1947); N.M.R. Civ. P. 44(d); N.D. REV. CODE § 31-1002 (1943);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 41.410 (1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-1 (1953).

These

statutes, however, make no reference, one way or the other, to the necessity
that notice be requested.
12. See, e.g., UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 9(2) and 9(3), quoted in note 1

supra. The following cases illustrate the kinds of matters here involved:
Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223 (1919); State v. Perkins, 342 Mo. 560,
116 S.W.2d 80 (1938); Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, 304 N.Y. 148, 106 N.E.2d 495 (1952).
In the Varcoe case, the court sitting in San Francisco noticed that the intersection of Mission and 21st Streets in San Francisco was in the business
district. In State v. Perkins, in determining whether chickens were stolen in
the nighttime, the court took judicial notice "that the sun rose that morning
at 4:31 a.m." and that it was "broad daylight" at 5 a.m. And in the Pfleuger
case, the New York court exercised the discretion accorded by N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
ACT § 344-a to notice Pennsylvania law.
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the "who" (which was the case with the second), emphasizes the
"how." It reflects the concept that the tribunal has the right, in appropriate instances, to inform itself as to a material matter by methods
in addition to the reception of formal evidence, and it is implicit

that the information may be obtained by resort to sources other than
those adduced by the litigating parties.'3
Indeed, this is the one distinguishing characteristic of judicial
notice! It is the one generalization which applies in all cases, and
only in cases, where it would be said that the expression "judicial
notice" is properly used.
When the term is properly used, therefore, it may or may not mean
that the judge has primary responsibility for injecting the information
into the collective mind of the tribunal. But it always signifies that
of all relevant information-information probative as to law or fact,
as to liability or remedy, as to substance or procedure-the information in question is not acquired by the court through the presentation
of formal evidence. Rather, the tribunal either already has the information or acquires it from a variety of sources and by a variety of
relatively informal methods adapted to the situation.
This generalization about judicial notice should not be misconstrued. It does not necessarily mean that matters judicially noticed
will be taken as true by the tribunal without investigation, without
regard to information offered by the parties, without warning, and
RULE OF EVIDENCE 10 (2), quoted in note 1 supra,follows MODEL
13. UNiRmO
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 804(2) (1942), and states this point expressly. A number of statutes, providing for judicial notice of certain facts and law, specify
that: "In all these cases the court may resort for its aid to appropriate books
or documents of reference." CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1875 (Deering 1953);
IDAho CODE ANN. § 9-101 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-501-1 (1947);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-1 (1953). N.D. REV. CODE § 31-1001 (1943) provides:
"No evidence of any fact of which the courts take judicial notice need be
given in any civil or criminal action or proceeding pending in this state by
the party alleging its existence, but any judge asked to take judicial notice
thereof, if unacquainted with such fact, may refer to any person, document,
or book of reference for his satisfaction in relation thereto, or may refuse to
take judicial notice thereof unless and until the party making the request
produces any such document or book of reference." Referring specifically to
judicial notice of foreign law, statutes in more than half of the states expressly
authorize resort by the judge to informal sources. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
ACT § 344-a (par. C); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-273 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5711
(1955); UNIFORm JUDICIAL NOTIcE OF FOREiGN LAW ACT § 2 (adopted in 26
states). The Uniform Act provides that: "The court may inform itself of
such laws in such manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call
upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information." The New York statute
states that: 'Wlhere a matter of law specified in this section is judicially
noticed, the court may consider any testimony, documents, information or
argument on the subject, whether the same is offered by counsel, as third
party or discovered through its own research." The Virginia statute, repeated
with only minor changes in West Virginia, provides that the judge "may consult any book of recognized authority purporting to contain, state or explain
the same [foreign law], and may consider any testimony, information or
argument that is offered on the subject."
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without chance for rebutting argument to the judge (although that
may sometimes be the case). It means only that the truth will be
ascertained by methods other than or in addition to the reception of
formal evidence.
2. What matters are noticed?-The determination as to what information need not be adduced as formal evidence (i.e., what may be
judicially noticed) reflects a judgment of appropriateness made by
the courts on the basis of experience over the years. The determination depends sometimes on the nature of the information itself and
sometimes on the nature of the proposition that the information is
offered to prove. The situation is confused and exception-riddled.
But it can be said that the vast majority of cases in which the principle of judicial notice is applied involve one or the other of the following judgments as to appropriateness:
(a) Law and legislative facts.-It is considered appropriate that a
court not be limited to formal evidence in its determination of matters of law. That is, the "rules" applied by the court are judicially
noticed. The judge is an expert in the law. The formal rules of
evidence are not necessary or even helpful in screening the information on which the judge bases his ruling. And, since rulings on
law should be the same in two similar cases and may be accorded
stare decisis effect, they should not be based solely on the information
which the parties to the instant controversy choose to adduce. There
is agreement, therefore, that, while the court may hear the parties
in its search for correct law, and may even solicit their aid, it is not
required to limit itself to information supplied by the parties nor to
permit the parties to address the trier of fact (judge or jury) by
introducing formal evidence on the matter. This is so whether the
court's search is for the words of a public statute, at one extreme, or
for particular facts (legislative facts) relevant to the meaning or constitutionality of a statute or common law rule, at the other. It is so
whether the data are indisputable or disputable. And it is so whether
the law in question pertains to liability, remedy or procedure and
before, during or after trial. (Unfortunately, and perhaps because of
an erroneous belief that judicial notice is limited to those matters of
which the judge is "chargeable" with knowledge (paragraph 1(b)
supra), the full freedom of judicial notice is usually not given to the
judge when the law governing the case is foreign or lesser-known
domestic law.)
(b) Indisputable adjudicative facts.-It is considered appropriate
that a court not be limited to formal evidence in its determination
even of some matters of fact-an area in which it is generally assumed
that the tribunal should confine itself, first, to information offered by
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the parties and, second, to information subject to rules of evidence
guaranteeing its sufficiency and trustworthiness. It should be clear
that the desirability of confining decision to evidence offered by the
parties must give way when the fact is patently indisputable. This is
because adherence to the general adversary principle risks an
obviously erroneous finding arguably leading to injustice in the particular case and certainly making the court appear ridiculous. And
insistence upon adherence to the formal rules of evidence, energy- and
time-consuming as they are, is scarcely justifiable when the fact is
patently indisputable.
There are two other, less often mentioned, areas in which the term
judicial notice properly applies. Both deal with matters relevant
to propositions of fact, and both overlap to some extent the kind of
judicially noticed (indisputable) matters just mentioned:
(c) Facts relevant to judge-imposed criminal sentence.-It is considered appropriate (at least, it has been established by tradition)
that the judge with responsibility for imposing criminal sentence not
be limited to formal evidence or information offered by the parties
when his objective is to resolve propositions of fact relevant only
to the imposition of the sentence. 14 Imposition of sentence almost
14. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47, 250 (1949). In
this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. While
committing a burglary, defendant had killed a 15-year-old girl by striking
her with an iron bar. The jury recommended life imprisonment. The judge
rejected the recommendation and imposed the death sentence. In doing so,
he relied on a pre-sentence investigation report provided for by New York
statute. Information expressly considered by the judge included defendant's
alleged participation in thirty other burglaries (he had confessed to some,
been identified as the perpetrator of others, but had been convicted of none)
and his "morbid sexuality." The United States Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the procedure employed by the judge violated the due process
clause:
"[246] Tribunals passing on the guilt of a defendant always have been
hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural limitations. But both before and
since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in
England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a
wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in
determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits
fixed by law.... In addition to the historical basis for different evidentiary
rules governing trial and sentencing procedures there are sound practical
reasons for the distinction. In a trial before verdict the issue is whether a
defendant is guilty of having engaged in certain criminal conduct of which
he has been specifically accused. Rules of evidence [247] have been fashioned
for criminal trials which narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence
that is strictly relevant to the particular offense charged. These rules rest in
part on a necessity to prevent a time-consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues. They were also designed to prevent tribunals concerned solely
with the issue of guilt of a particular offense from being influenced to convict
for that offense by evidence that the defendant had habitually engaged in
other misconduct. A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the narrow
issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory . . .limits is to determine the

type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined.
Highly relevant-if not essential-to his selection of an appropriate sentence
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always involves a broad exercise of discretion and, as in rulings on
the law, a special responsibility to see that the action taken is in harmony with action taken in other, similar cases. The judge frequently
could not fulfill his responsibility intelligently if his information were
limited to that admissible in evidence, that tendered by the parties,
or that which is indisputably true and therefore noticeable under
paragraph (b) above.
(d) Background facts ("jury notice").-It is considered appropriate
that a judge or juror be permitted to employ, inconspicuously and
interstitially in his elementary processes of understanding and reasoning, his beliefs (though they are not in evidence) which he reasonably
thinks he shares with other intelligent persons as to the general nature
of things-the meanings of ordinary words, typical modes of human
is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's

life and characteristics.

And modern concepts individualizing punishment

have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied
an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid
adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial....
[250] We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon by
judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be
unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by

witnesses subject to cross-examination .... Such a procedure could endlessly

delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues."
A similar phenomenon-resort to extra-record, disputable information in
fashioning a remedy-is common practice in administrative proceedings. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953). In that case, the
Court approved the action of the NLRB in applying to the case before it the
so-called "Woolworth formula" for computing back pay of a discriminatorily
discharged employee. The Court, at 349, rejected the argument that the
Board was limited, in its selection of remedy, to the record of the particular
proceedings. Strong arguments exist for the extension of this liberal practice
to judicial cases where the remedy amounts to much more than a settlement
of a private dispute. A decree in a large anti-trust case, for example, may
also be an enunciation of policy with far-reaching implications. There is language in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d
Cir. 1945), which might be misconstrued as allowing courts, in some instances,
to notice even disputable matters relevant to fashioning decrees. In that case,
the government alleged violations of the anti-trust laws by defendant. The
trial judge, after a two-year trial beginning in 1938, dismissed the case. By
the time the case reached the appellate court, enormous changes in the situation had been wrought by World War II. These changes were catalogued in
the so-called "Truman Report." Speaking for the court, L. Hand, J., said, "we
refuse to take 'notice' of facts relevant to the correctness of the findings; but
we do take 'notice' of those relevant to remedies." The court therefore limited
itself to the evidence before the trial judge in holding that the judge was
wrong in dismissing the case, but took account of the later, informal information for purposes of refusing to formulate and enter a decree. The case was
remanded for the trial judge to fashion the decree. See United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), for the action
taken by the trial judge. The lower court, in that later disposition of the case,
probably relaxed the hearsay rule to some extent. Compare United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820, 823-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); see
Note, The Hearsay Rule in Civil Antitrust Suits, 60 YALE L.J. 363 (1951). But
there is no indication in the opinion that judicial notice rather than formal
evidence was relied on to establish disputable specific facts central to the
remedy.
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behavior, causal relations between commonplace events, and the like.
In most instances these beliefs, assumptions, preconceptions, are
true in the sense relevant to the controversy. In most of the remaining instances, either the error or the issue is relatively trivial. And
the remainder of instances illustrates a largely unavoidable characteristic of a fact-finding system employing imperfect human beings. A
trial, after all, is a human process, and the judge and jury must be
accepted with their normal human characteristics. This assumes
that any one of them will have beliefs which are at least partially
wrong, that no two of them will share exactly the same beliefs, and
that the reasoning processes of no two will operate in exactly the
same way.
As indicated in paragraph (a) above, al matters relevant to law
(at least to domestic public law) are judicially noticed, so no special
category for "background facts" is necessary where proof of tenor of
the law is the use made of the information. The category is important,
however, where a determination of fact or an application of law to
fact is involved. Since these typically are functions of the trier of
fact-of the jury if there is one-this category of judicial notice is
often referred to by the somewhat misleading name "jury notice."
Information falling within "jury notice," because of its elusive,
elemental nature, is usually not expressed in any formal way at the
trial (although often it is employed in argument by counsel). It is
simply assumed to be playing its catalytic role in the jurors' minds.
Thus, since the borderline between "background" facts and what
might be called "foreground" facts is impossible to define, it should
come as no surprise that a "jury noticed" fact is sometimes flushed to
the surface by a party and is there subjected to the test of judicial
notice in the traditional sense (paragraph (b) above) and, if it fails
that test, to the requirement of proof by formal evidence.15
15. In addition to the cases cited infra §§ 2569 (judge's private knowledge)
and 2570 (jury's own knowledge), see the following cases illustrative of the
line between jury notice and judicial notice, and between jury notice and
evidence.
On the question of admissibility of expert testimony as to matters which
might be thought to be within the area of common knowledge, compare Nelson
v. Brames, 241 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp.
559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); and Piechota v. Rapp, 148 Neb. 443, 27 N.W.2d 682 (1947),
with Gibson v. United States, 200 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1952) (brief for appellant, appendix, pp. 22a-24a); State v. Chingren, 105 Iowa 169, 74 N.W. 946
(1898); and Commonwealth v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68, 21 N.E. 228 (1889).
In the first three cases, expert evidence was admitted on the questions,
respectively, of the manner in which chains on automobile tires affect skidding on ice, of the relation between a witness' demeanor on the stand and
his credibility, and of the fact that alcohol has a retarding effect on the
reflexes. In the latter three cases, expert evidence was excluded where
offered to prove, respectively, that medical advice given by a physician was
not proper, that there was a custom to mark up the price of land where it
was traded for merchandise, and that cigars are drugs or medicines.
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3. Summary.-What are the considerations dominant in the principle of judicial notice in its two main areas of application? In judicial
notice of Zaw, the dominant considerations are the expertness of the
judge and the unique responsibility of the judge to determine law
consistently with determinations in other, similar cases and with a
view to the impact on later cases. The considerations dominant in the
principle of judicial notice of indisputable adjudicative fact are the
saving of time and prevention of flagrant mistake.
What does the theory of judicial notice leave to formal evidence?
If facts relevant solely to criminal sentence (2(c) above) and matters
comprising the judge or jury's elementary common general beliefs
On the question of what a judge may say to the jury by way of comment,
necessarily involving general propositions of fact, compare Quercia v. United
States, 289 U.S. 466, 468 (1933) (fully cited supra § 2551, note 7), where it was
held error for the trial judge to remind the jury that the defendant "wiped
his hands during his testimony" and that "that is almost always an indication
of lying," with Marshall v. State, 54 Fla. 66, 71, 44 So. 742, 743 (1907), where
it was held proper for the judge to instruct the jury to "bring to bear upon the
consideration of the evidence . .. all that common knowledge of men and
affairs, which you, as reasonable men have and exercise in the every day
affairs of life." See also cases cited supra §§ 2551, 2551a.
For a discussion of the limits of argument by counsel, see §§ 1806 and 1807
supra. See also Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts Ndt in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1956). And, with
respect to reversal of judicial action because it is based in part on information
not in evidence, compare United States v. Wilson, 284 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1960),
with United States v. Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1960), and Tennessee
Gas Transmission Co. v. Hall, 277 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). In the
Wilson case, the judge, for purposes of imposing a longer sentence, had noticed
that 72 rifles stolen from the government, which were produced and observed
in court, were worth more than $100. He was reversed. In the Hayashi case,
the court, in an action for wrongful death, assumed arguendo that there was
sufficient evidence of damages to one daughter and insufficient evidence of
damages to another daughter, but sustained the jury award to both daughters
on the ground that "the court would be entitled to take judicial notice of that
fact that in the normal family the father has equal love and affection for all of
his children and provides equal care, guidance, discipline and support." In the

Hall case, a verdict was affirmed although the jurors were motivated, in set-

ting the value of an easement, by the possibility, raised by some jurors during
deliberations, that a "chisel" plow might dig deep enough to penetrate the
underground gas line, causing gas to escape. (Distinguish the parol-evidencerule principle which may be employed to protect verdicts from attack even if
the matter considered by the jury is neither in evidence nor properly a subject of jury notice.)
I
The fundamental, and 5yet elusive, character of "jury notice" is emphasized

by the following two quotations: THAYER, A PRELMINARY TREATISE ON EvIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 279-80 (1898): "The subject of judicial notice,

then, belongs to the general topic of legal or judicial reasoning. It is, indeed,
woven into the very texture of the judicial function. In conducting a process
of judicial reasoning, as of other reasoning, not a step can be taken without
assuming something which has not been proved; and the capacity to do this,
with competent judgment [280] and efficiency, is imputed to judges and juries
as part of their necessary mental outfit." And Bitterman, The Evaluation of
Psychological Propositions, in LEVIN, EVIDENCE AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
III-A-16 (mimeo. 1956): "Our everyday experience of the world comes in
crude, unrepresentative chunks, with casual relations hopelessly obscured,
and with prejudice, superstition, and self-interest inextricably intertwined in

perception."
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used only interstitially in their understanding and reasoning processes (2(d) above) can be treated separately, this can be said: What
in theory is left to formal evidence is information which is not patently
indisputable (2(b) above) and which is relevant to what is known
as factual inquiry (2(a) above). That is: What is left to formal
evidence is disputable adjudicative facts.
The following diagram illustrates the complementary roles played
by judicial notice and formal evidence in the process of informing
the court as to matters relevant to decision:
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
Relevant to Remedy

Indisputable

Relevant to Liability

Relevant to Fact

Relevant to Law

NOTE: The large cube purports to represent all information employed by
a court in arriving at a decision.

The three dimensions are employed to

illustrate the significance of three distinctions relating to kinds of facts or
purposes for which they are employed. Not illustrated is the important but
elusive distinction which qualifies matter for so-called "jury notice."
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§ 2566. ANOMALOUS MEA=NNGS OF THE TERM JUDICIAL NOTICE
[Author's Note. The proposed revision of this section involves so few changes from the third edition (1940) that the
section is omitted here. The only significant addition to the
"anomalous meanings of the term judicial notice" now contemplated is the "judicial notice presumption." That is the
view of judicial notice preferred by Dean Wigmore himself
but opposed by Professor Morgan and rejected in the revisions
of §§ 2565 and 2567 here proposed.]

§ 2567. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL NoTIcE-Is IT CONCLUSIVE?
There are two views as to the "conclusiveness" of judicial notice. On
one side of the argument may be found Wigmore, following Thayer
in the view that judicial notice is not conclusive; on the other side,
asserting that judicial notice is conclusive, is Morgan:
WIGMORE, 9 Evidence § 2567 (3d ed. 1940): (a) That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without the offering
of evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so. This is
because the Court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will
not be disputed. But the opponent is not prevented from disputing the
matter by evidence, if he believes it disputable. It is true that occasionally a Court is found declaring a thing judicially noticed and at the
same time refusing to listen to evidence to the contrary; but usually this
is in truth laying down a new rule of substantive law by declaring certain facts immaterial; whenever a Court forbids the production of evidence, it removes the subject from the realm of the law of evidence
properly so called.
(b) The process of taking judicial notice often may imply incidentally
a ruling as to the respective functions of judge and jury. Does it signify
that the settlement of the matter rests with the judge and not with the
jury, that the jury are to accept the fact from the judge, and that so far
as any further investigation is concerned, it is for the judge alone? Such
is the view sometimes found, in decisions as well as statutes. Yet it seems
rather that the jury are not concluded; that the process of notice is
intended chiefly for expedition of proof; and that since the fact is
disputable by the opponent (supra, par. a), it remains possible for the
jury to negative it. In those classes of facts, however, in which the
judge has the function of decision and not the jury (ante, §§ 2549-2559),
it would be true, so far as any such facts were capable of notice, that the
judge's determination is exclusive; but this would not be by virtue of
the doctrine of judicial notice.
(c) That the appellate tribunal is not concluded by the ruling of the
trial Court, would seem clear. The appellate tribunal may re-examine
the question of judicial notice, not only by re-considering the information
used by the trial Court, but also by considering additional information.

MORGAN, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 273-74, 279, 285 (1944): In an adversary
system such as ours, where the court is bound to know the law and the
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parties to make known the facts, it is particularly important that the

court prevent a party from presenting a moot issue or inducing a false
result by disputing what in the existing state of society is demonstrably
indisputable among reasonable men. Just as the court cannot function
unless the judge knows the law and unless the judge and jury have the
fund of information common to all intelligent men in the community as
well as the capacity to use the ordinary processes of reasoning, so it cannot
adjust legal relations among members of society and thus fulfill the sole
purpose of its creation if it permits the parties to take issue on, and thus
secure results contrary to, what is so notoriously true as not to be the
subject of reasonable dispute, or what is capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to sources of indisputable accuracy easily
accessible to men in the situation of members of the court. This, it is submitted, [274] is the rock of reason and policy upon which judicial notice
of facts is built....

[279] If taking judicial notice of a matter means that it is indisputable,
it must follow that no evidence to the contrary is admissible. If evidence
to the contrary of what is judicially noticed is admissible, it must follow
that the basis of judicial notice is not the prohibition against presenting
moot issues and against maintaining a claim or defense on a false issue;
its basis must be only convenience in trial, and the applicable considerations must be almost identical with those governing the allocation of the
burden of proof....
[285] The truth, then, is that there are at least some matters of fact
in the realm of judicial notice which are not subject to contradiction by
evidence, and that the decisions rejecting or disregarding the contrary
evidence can be explained on no other theory. It is also true that in
some cases a trial judge has been reversed for rejecting evidence as to
matter which he ruled to be within the domain of judicial notice. There
is not a single decision reversing, and it is believed not a single judicial
expression disapproving, the action of a trial judge in rejecting evidence
of a matter held by the appellate court to be a proper subject of judicial
notice. The reversals are easily explained as holding that the matter in
question was not within the field of judicial notice. The decisions affirming the rulings rejecting the contrary evidence, as well as others reversing rulings receiving or giving effect to such evidence, cannot be harmonized with Mr. Wigmore's theory. In his opinion there is no matter of fact
that is not subject to dispute....
Are these learned authors [Wigmore and Thayer] really making the
field of judicial notice a segment of the field of presumptions? . . .

The difference of opinion is not complete. There is no difference
of opinion as to matters of law. Where judicial notice of law is proper,
it is agreed that a judge is not obliged to receive formal evidence to
rebut his taking of judicial notice of any matter (legislative facts)
helpful in determining the tenor of that law. Even with respect to
matters of fact, the disagreement is not pervasive. There is no dissent
from the proposition that judicial notice of the rarely mentioned matters of fact relating to judge-imposed sentences is not rebuttable by
formal evidence. There may even be no disagreement as to the
rebuttability of "jury notice" of the vague and almost indefinable
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matters of belief used peripherally in the reasoning process, but this
point has not been emphasized and is therefore unclear. The real
difference between these authorities is limited to rebuttability of
judicial notice where it is applied to other matters of fact. Disregarding for the moment "jury-notice" facts and "judge-sentencing" facts,
it can be said that the dispute relates to the rebuttability of judicial
notice of "adjudicative facts." The question is this: Assuming that it
is proper to take judicial notice of information central to what is called
the factual component of a determination of liability or remedy, may
the prejudiced party rebut the judge's determination by formal evidence tendered to the trier of fact?
Wigmore and Thayer say yes.1 Morgan says no.2 The cases and

§ 2567. 1. See the quotation in text supra from 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2567 (3d ed. 1940). In accord are THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 308 (1898) ('Taking judicial notice does not

import that the matter is indisputable. It is not necessarily anything more
than a prima facie recognition, leaving the matter still open to controversy");
TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 46 (1952)

("a judge may take

judicial notice of a fact whose existence is really doubtful. Objecting counsel
is not bound by the ruling if he has evidence to offer to the contrary"); Davis,
Judicial Notice, 55 CoLum. L. REV. 945, 979 (1955) ("requests for reconsideration of rulings on judicial or official notice must be entertained and the
judge or officer must have the discretionary power, as now, to allow or to
deny opportunity to support the request with argument or with evidence").
Bentham, as indicated supra § 2565, note 3, urged a device of this kind. Two
great judges have announced dicta in support of this interpretation of the law:
Cardozo, J., in Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 301
(1937), and L. Hand, J., in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945). For a full citation of these two cases and for
other cases supporting the Wigrnore view, see note 3 infra.
2. See the quotation in text supra from Morgan, 57 HARV. L. REv. 269, 273-74,
279, 285 (1944). In agreement with the Morgan position are MAGuRE, EVIDENCE-COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 174 (1947)

("the judge's decision

to take judicial notice should be final"); Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and
Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664, 668 (1950) ("The better
view would seem to be that a fact, once judicially noticed, is not open to evi-dence disputing it"); McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAW. L. REV. 296, 321-322
(1952) ("the weight [322] of reason and the prevailing authority support the
view that a ruling that a fact will be judicially noticed precludes contradictory
evidence and requires that the judge instruct the jury that they must accept
the fact as true"); Nokes, The Limits of Judicial Notice, 74 L.Q. REV. 59,
72-73 (1958) ("On principle there would seem to be no [73] doubt that
judicial notice is final. . . . However, there may occur circumstances in
which judicial notice presents the appearance of operating as the equivalent
of a rebuttable presumption, when its effect provides an apparent or actual
parallel to prima facie evidence. Yet these circumstances occur only when
judicial notice is inapplicable or partial or premature").
UNIoFRM RULE OF EVIDENCE 11 (quoted supra § 2565, note 1) and MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 804 (1942)

accord with the Morgan view, set out in

text supra. The comment to the Model Code rule states: "If a matter falls
within the domain of judicial knowledge, it is beyond the realm of dispute;
therefore, evidence is unnecessary. It is the judge's function to decide
whether a matter is a subject of evidence or of judicial notice.... In a few
cases it is said that the judge should have received evidence offered to show
the opposite of what he declared to be a judicially noticed fact. What is
meant is that the subject did not fall within the realm of judicial notice."
See the cases in note 3 infra, some of which support the Morgan view.
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3
statutes are in cloudy confusion.

3. The following cases are the ones commonly cited in support of or in
opposition to the proposition that judicial notice is "conclusive." Most of the
cases, for reasons apparent from reading the abstracts below, are distinguishable. Perhaps a dozen of them, properly interpreted, involve judicial notice
not of fact but of law, where there is no disagreement that (if the law may
'be noticed at all) notice is "conclusive." See, e.g., Laubenheimer v. Factor
(Fed.); Young v. Boy Scouts of America (Cal.); State v. Cromwell (N.J.).
A few of the cases involve rejection of evidence offered not to rebut but to
support the matter noticed. See, e.g., Stocker v. Boston & Maine R.R. (N.H.).
At least two of the cases involve rejection of evidence offered to prove a
matter held by the court not to be properly in issue. State ex rel. Landis v.
Thompson (Fla.); Ex parte Kair (Nev.). One decision straddles the issue,
making "judicial knowledge" conclusive but "judicial notice" rebuttablel
State v. Lawrence (Utah). A number of the decisions purporting to support
the Wigmore view involve situations in which, without regard to rebuttability,
the matters were obviously inappropriate for judicial notice in the first place.
See, e.g., In re Bowling Green Mill Co. (Fed.); Scheufler v. Continental Life
Ins. Co. (Mo.); Llubera v. Mercado E Hijos (P.R.); State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Norcross (Wis.). Or they involve situations in which the court is
concerned not with rebuttability of a matter noticed but rather with opportunity to be heard on the question whether notice should be taken. See, e.g.,
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n. (Fed.) (dealing, in any event, with
procedures before an administrative agency, distinguished infra in discussion
of Federal Administrative Procedure Act § 7(d)); Panama Canal Co. v.
Wagner (Fed.). And, in many of the cases, the point one way or the other is
made almost gratuitously and is therefore barest dictum. See, e.g., United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Fed.) (supporting rebuttability); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Ford (Ariz.) (supporting conclusiveness); Board of Comm'rs.
of Crawford County v. Radley (Kan.) (supporting rebuttability). Perhaps
the strongest cases in support of the principle of "conclusiveness" are the
Beardsley (Conn.), LaRue (Kan.) and Marzynski (Mass.) cases, although the

Nicketta (Il.) and Taylor (Eng.) cases, dismissing complaints because it was
judicially noticed that pleaded facts were untrue, are also strong by implication. The best cases arrayed against "conclusiveness" probably are the Ohio
Bell and Aluminum Co. cases (both Fed.), where respect is commanded by
the greatness of the opinion-writers rather than by the relevance of the dicta
to the facts, and the Timson (Mo.) and Duranleau (N.H.) cases, where judg-

ments were overturned ostensibly (although this is not clear) to permit the
party against whom judicial notice was taken to introduce evidence in rebuttal.
UNTED STATEs: Federal: Lane v. Sargent, 217 Fed. 237, 238-39 (1st Cir.
1914) (action in federal court sitting, with jury, in New Hampshire, for
injuries sustained in an accident in Massachusetts; on the theory that the
"foreign law" of Massachusetts must be proved as a fact, defendant offered in
evidence, to be read to the jury, three decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, the evidence was rejected by the trial judge on the ground
that "the question is a question of law for the court to pass upon, and the
court is very glad to have any citation of Massachusetts law submitted to the
court, and the court will instruct the jury upon what the Massachusetts [239]
law is"; held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed; the court "'takets] judicial
notice of the Constitution and public laws of each state of the Union' . ,
'those laws are known to the court ...as laws alone, needing no averment or
proof'"); Seebach v. United States, 262 Fed. 885, 888 (8th Cir. 1919) (conviction for willful attempts to cause insubordination and refusal of duty in
military forces during time of war; the trial court in its charge judicially
noticed that the United States was at war when the acts were done; no contrary evidence had been offered and no objection was made; semble: "So far
as judicial notice is concerned, see . . . [three Supreme Court decisions].

Judicial notice having been properly taken of a fact not embracing the entire
issue made by the plea of not guilty, it was not necessary to submit it to the
decision of the jury. In effect it became a matter of law for the court to
instruct them"; the court then quoted, in support of its position, language
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justifying a trial judge in instructing a jury "as to the principles applicable
to the case" where all of the evidence on an issue is "clear and uncontradicted"); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1937)
(commission, in determining that rates charged by the company between
1926 and 1933 were excessive, ascertained the value of company property
during those years by modifying the value on June 30, 1925, in accordance
-with changes in price trends; reliance was placed on the tax value of land
in relevant communities, on price indices in a recognized engineering magazine, and on a finding in a federal proceeding relating to price levels; the
data were not in evidence and no warning, prior to the filing of the report in
1934, was given to the company that the extra-record data would be relied
on; the commission refused to permit the company to submit evidence as to
the value of its property during each year; opinion by Cardozo, J.; held, that
"'[300] The fundamentals of a trial were denied to the appellant where rates
previously collected were ordered to be refunded upon the strength of evidential facts not spread upon the record"; reliance upon undisclosed "underlying
proofs" is "not the fair hearing essential to due process"; a tribunal may take
judicial notice of the fact that prices have gone down, but "[301] not of the
extent of the depreciation at a given time and place"; "Moreover, notice,
even when taken, has no other effect that to relieve one of the parties to the
controversy of the burden of resorting to the usual forms of evidence ...
[Citing Wigmore.] 'It does not [302] mean that the opponent is prevented
from disputing the matter by evidence if he believes it disputable' "; decree
reversed); Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1932) (habeas
corpus; federal court, sitting in Illinois, in determining whether the crime for
which England wanted petitioner extradited was also a crime in Illinois, the
place of asylum, relied on testimony of experts as to Illinois law; held, trial
-court's order discharging petitioner on habeas corpus reversed; "federal courts
take judicial notice of the public laws of all states, and of course the particular
state wherein the court is sitting .... We are satisfied that the District Court
erred in holding the question to be one of fact, and in according effect to the
testimony of legal experts"); In re Bowling Green Mill Co., 132 F.2d 279, 283
(6th Cir. 1942) (to prove priority in bankruptcy proceeding, farmers holding
so-called "white receipts" sought to show that the relationship between them
and the bankrupt mill was bailor-bailee; the trial court took judicial notice of
a custom in Kentucky that the relationship was one of sale; held, that the
receipt-holders were bailors; a court may judicially notice a general custom,
but there was no such custom in this case; first mention of the custom was
in the district court's opinion; "Usage or custom cannot be availed of to
dispense with evidence unless the fact shown is certain and indisputable."
[The quotation from page 301 of the Ohio Bell case, supra, taken from Wigmore, is then quoted.]); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945) (see facts of the case supra § 2565 note 14; L. Hand, J.:
"facts which a court may judicially 'notice' do not for that reason become
indisputable. Wigmore, § 2567a"); United States v. Grady, 225 F.2d 410, 416-17
(7th Cir. 1955) (prosecution for violation of Commodity Exchange Act; an
issue was whether the Chicago Open Board of Trade was a "contract market";
it had been so designated by federal regulations promulgated pursuant to
statute, and proper copies of the regulations were received in evidence over
defendant's objections; the trial judge instructed the jury that he found "as
a matter of law, that the Chicago Open Board of Trade is a contract market
within the meaning of the Commodity Exchange Act and you are so instructed"; defendant contended that the issue was one of fact for the jury;
held that the judge could have taken judicial notice of the fact, so it was
"unnecessary to submit this facet of the case to the jury";' semble (at 417)
that defendant could have offered evidence disputing the matter noticed, but
that he did not do so, quoting Wigmore, § 2567 with approval); Panama Canal
Co. v. Wagner, 234 F.2d 163, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1956) (injury from faulty stairway; on the issue of assumption of risk, the trial court on its own motion took
judicial notice of the fact that tenants in the Zone are assigned to their
quarters and have little choice of assignments; defendants were allowed a
month in which to "advise the Court whether or not they desire to submit
proof on the factual assumptions which the Court took judicial notice thereof";
no proofs were offered; judgment for plaintiff affirmed; Rives, J., in concur-
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ring opinion, approved of the use of judicial notice, but stated (at 170) that:
"The saving grace of the ruling, I think, is that the district court expressly
recognized the right of the appellant to dispute that matter judicially noticed
by evidence if it believed it disputable, thus differing from those courts
which refuse to hear evidence concerning matters of which they take judicial
notice").
Distinguish Administrative Procedure Act § 7(d), 60 Stat. 241, 242 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1006(d) (1958). It provides: '"Where any agency decision rests on
official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record,
any party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show the
contrary." The procedures employed by administrative agencies in acquiring
information are for a number of reasons quite different from those used by
courts. See §§ 4(a)-(c) supra; GELLroRN & BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 866-69
(4th ed. 1960). Significantly, in administrative proceedings there is no
jury and there is substantial relaxation of the rules of evidence. In such a context, of course, it makes no sense to draw a distinction between opportunity to
be heard informally by the judge on the question whether notice should be
taken on the one hand, and opportunity to offer formal evidence to the jury
in rebuttal of a matter noticed by the judge on the other. In courts, where the
distinction does make sense, the parties are afforded "an opportunity to show
the contrary" only by way of the former of these two methods. See § 2568
infra; UmuFomv RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 10(1), 12(4) (quoted supra § 2565 n.1).
MODEL STATE ADmmisTRATIV PROCEDURE ACT § 9(4) (1946): "Agencies may

take notice of judicially cognizable facts and in addition may take notice of
general, technical, or scientific facts within their specialized knowledge.
Parties shall be notified either before or during hearing, or by reference in
preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material so noticed, and they shall
be afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Agencies may
utilize their experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in
the evaluation of the evidence presented to them." (Emphasis added.) Either
this provision or one similar to it appears in the legislation of a number of
states. The irrelevance of administrative agency official-notice practice to the
question of rebuttability of judicial notice is explained supra in the discussion
of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act § 7(d).
Alaska: ALAsKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 66-13-62 (1949) (discussed infra, at
the end of this footnote).
Arizona: Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ford, 68 Ariz. 190, 196, 203 P.2d 633,638
(1949) (action under state occupational disease disability law; plaintiff alleged total disability caused by silicosis; industrial commission found for
plaintiff, judicially noticing that silicon dioxide dust in harmful quantities
existed; held, award set aside; dictum: "A fact of which a court may take
judicial notice must be indisputable. This being true it follows that evidence
may not be received to dispute it"; held also that the commission could not,
in making the finding, rely on findings it had made in earlier cases); Utah
Const. Co. v. Berg, 68 Ariz. 285, 291, 205 P.2d 367,370 (1949) (same; dictum:
"A fact to be judicially noticed must be certain and indisputable, requiring
no proof, and no evidence may be received to refute it"); Verner v. Redman,
77 Ariz. 310, 314, 271 P.2d 468, 470 (1954) (suit to enjoin construction of
service station; trial judge granted the injunction, taking judicial notice that
the building would depreciate the value of residential property three blocks
away, thus dispensing with evidence of special damages to the petitioners;
held, distinguishing earlier cases where the affected property was in proximity,
that judicial notice here was improper and judgment reversed; "the fact of
damages [must be] so certain and indisputable that evidence will not be
received to refute it").
California:People v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 627, 45 Pac. 860, 862 (1896) (prosecution for stealing a blue steer; witness for defendant testified that "betwixt
nine and ten" or "along about ten o'clock" on the night in question, while the
moon was up and shining, he saw one of the state's witnesses driving a dark
colored animal; although no evidence was introduced on the point, the judge
charged the jury that the moon on that night rose at 10:57 o'clock; defendant
was convicted; on his motion for a new trial, he filed the affidavit of a third
person to the effect that the moon rose at 10:35 p.m.; conviction affirmed;
judicial notice was proper and, per CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 2102 (Deering
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1953): "Whenever the knowledge of the court is by this Code made evidence
of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the jury, who are bound
to accept it"; the affidavit is mere hearsay "insufficient to overcome the
presumption of the correctness of the court's statement to the jury"); Young
v. Boy Scouts of America, 9 Cal. App. 2d 760, 764, 51 P.2d 191, 193 (1935)
(action against Boy Scouts of America for negligence in selection of scout
master who allegedly instructed juvenile plaintiff to ride bicycle at night in
such a way as to be injured by automobile; demurrers, based on immunity
of charitable organizations, sustained; judicial notice taken of the act of Congress under which Boy Scouts was organized and of the constitution and
by-laws filed with Congress pursuant to the act, showing it to be a charitable
institution; "Any allegations of the complaint which conflict with facts of
which we must take judicial notice must be disregarded"). The statute,
Connecticut:State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 136, 37 Ati. 80, 84 (1897) (information for violation of statute relating to destruction of trees diseased by "peach
yellows"; judicial notice taken that the disease existed and was serious; held
that statute was constitutional and that it was not the function of the jury
to pass on constitutionality; "If, in regard to any subject of judicial notice,
the court should permit documents to be referred to or testimony introduced,
it would not be, in any proper sense, the admission of evidence, but simply
a resort 'to a convenient means of refreshing the memory, or making the trier
aware of that of which everybody ought to be aware. The defendant, therefore, had no right to have the jury pass upon the danger of contagion from
trees affected by the yellows, as a means of determining the constitutionality
of the statute"); Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489, 491, 71 Atl. 580, 581 (1909)
(breach of warranty as to soundness of a horse; verdict for plaintiff necessarily depended on a finding by the jury, based on conflicting testimony, that
the contract was not entered into on a Sunday; new trial ordered; "The defendant was entitled to have the jury plainly and clearly instructed whether
or not June 3, 1906, came upon a Sunday .... The nature of the subject, the
issue involved, and the apparent necessities of the case, require the court to
notice judicially which of these days was Sunday").
Florida: State ex rel. Landis v. Thompson, 121 Fla. 561, 572, 164 So. 192,
197 (1935) (attempt to attack the validity of a legislative enactment in a
motion for writ of ouster; court refused to test the correctness of the legislative record, indicating passage of the measure, in such a collateral proceeding; "so long as the questioned journals purport to stand as conclusive records
of the Legislature, valid on their face, they must be judicially noticed as
such by the courts in all proceedings not directly involving an adjudication
as to the verity of such records. Judicial notice not only supplies the want
of evidence to establish the fact judicially noticed, but necessarily precludes
all attempts to proffer contradictory evidence to refute what the court holds
that it must judicially know in the circumstances"); Schriver v. Tucker, 42
So. 2d 707, 709-10 (Fla. 1949) (habeas corpus; accused objected to sufficiency
of papers attached to rendition warrant in extradition proceedings; the
court, assuming arguendo that the parties stipulated that the papers did not
include the required Requisition of the Governor of Illinois, denied habeas
corpus; "even if it be considered that it was so stipulated, this court cannot
consider itself bound by such stipulation in the instant case. . . .This court
will take judicial notice, as the court below could have done, of the records
of extradition proceedings on file in the office of the Secretary of State. ...
From such records, it affirmatively appears that there was submitted to the
Governor of Florida by the Governor of Illinois an official Requisition ....
[710] [Citing the Landis case, supra,] 'Judicial notice . . . necessarily precludes all attempts to proffer contradictory evidence'"); Makos v. Prince, 64
So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 1953) (liquor dealers sought to enjoin commissioners
from enforcing an allegedly arbitrary resolution setting different hours-of-sale
for different parts of the country; trial judge dismissed the bill, taking judicial
notice that the areas were sufficiently different socially and economically to
make the resolution reasonable; held, remanded with instructions that dealers
be permitted to file an amended bill disputing the matters noticed; "as to
matters of which the court may take judicial notice because they are matters
of common knowledge, as distinguished from certain official records . . .
[citing the two cases abstracted supra], the rule is that the fact that a matter
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is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without the neces-

sity of offering evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so.
This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that the
matter will not be disputed. But the rule does not prevent an opponent's
disputing the matter by evidence if he believes it disputable. Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d Ed., Section 2567 p.535").
Georgia: Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 339, 53 S.E.2d 571,
574 (1949) (action for double indemnity under contract which precluded
double indemnity for death resulting from military service in time of war;
death was from explosion of ammunition dump in Germany on August 19,
1945; defendant, on ground that the court should judicially notice truth to the
contrary, demurred to plaintiff's allegation that the war was over on August
15, 1945; overruling of the demurrer sustained; the court construed the term
"war" in the contract to mean "shooting war" and judicially noticed that it
did end on August 15, 1945; "The allegations of the petition which negative
facts, the truth of which it is the duty of the court to take judicial cognizance,
must be disregarded"). In this case, it should be noted, the court noticed
the truth rather than the falsity of the pleading. The above-quoted dictum is
therefore inappropriately phrased.
Illinois: Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 162, 168, 87 N.E.2d
30, 31, 34 (1949) (breach of warranty; trial judge dismissed complaint on
ground that it is impossible to contract trichinosis as plaintiff alleged-from
eating pork which has been properly cooked; affirmed; plaintiff "[34] alleged
a factual impossibility"; "[31] In a few cases it is said that the judge should
have received evidence offered to show the opposite of what he declared to
be a judicially noticed fact. What is meant is that the subject did not fall
within the realm of judicial notice").
Indiana: Taggart v. Keebler, 198 Ind. 633, 642, 154 N.E. 485, 488 (1926)
(automobile-bicycle collision; "The court did not err in refusing to admit
,evidence of the provisions of said act of Congress [covering a pension paid
to plaintiff and the relevancy of which is unclear]. Courts have judicial
knowledge of the laws in force at the place where they are sitting, including
acts of Congress that are in force there and what is judicially known need
not be proved").
Iowa: State v. Chingren, 105 Iowa 169, 172, 74 N.W. 946, 947 (1898) (prosecution for fraud in a trade of land for merchandise; defendant's evidence
that there was a custom to mark up the price of land when it is traded for
goods was rejected; conviction affirmed; "It is a matter of common knowledge
.... This is generally known, and there was no occasion to prove that men
sometimes ask more for a thing than it is worth"). Note that in this case
the rejected evidence was offered to support, not to rebut, the noticed fact.
Kansas: LaRue v. Kansas Mut. Life Ins. Co., 68 Kan. 539, 540, 543, 75 Pac.
494, 495, 496 (1904) (action for proceeds of life insurance, with amount payable depending on whether insured died in military service in time of war;
the trial court rejected plaintiff's offer to prove that where insured was in the
Philippines, there was no armed resistance; judgment for defendant affirmed;
judicial notice taken that, at time of insured's death in 1900 "[540] in the
Island of Mindanao, by a blow from a weapon known as a bolo, in the hands
" the inhabitants of Mindanao were in a state of insurof an insurrecto ...
rection; "[543] courts take judicial notice of it as a fact in history"); Board
of Comm'rs v. Radley, 134 Kan. 704, 708, 8 P.2d 386, 388 (1932) (appellant
contested the validity of county sale of land for delinquent taxes in 1928; the
procedure followed, dispensing with public auction, had been proper prior to
1921 but was allegedly improper thereafter because of the absence of a new
resolution by the county commissioners adopting the 1921 statute providing
for dispensing with public auction; it had been said in a 1915 case, referring
to the pre-1921 situation, that judicial notice would be taken of the adoption
then by the county of the no-auction procedure; semble: "But judicial notice
is not conclusive,.... [quoting Wigmore]"; sale held invalid).
Maryland: Macht v. Hecht Co., 191 Md. 98, 102, 59 A.2d 754, 756 (1948)
(bill for declaratory decree permitting company, pursuant to a city ordinance,
to connect two buildings over an alley, leaving a tunnel thirteen feet high;
abutting landowners declined to consent, asserting that the ordinance was
invalid; the landowners demurred to the company's allegation that the land-
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owners would not suffer the special damages requisite to challenge the ordinance, taking the position that the court should judicially notice the harm;
" 'But the opponent is not prevented from disputing the matter by evidence,
if he believes it disputable.' 9 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., § 2567 . . . Here the bill shows upon its face the existence of a dispute as to facts upon
which the appellants' rights to challenge the validity of the Ordinance must.
depend." Demurrer held properly overruled).
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68, 72, 21 N.E. 228,
229 (1889) (prosecution for keeping shop open for purposes of doing businesson Sunday; the judge excluded expert testimony offered by defendant to the
effect that cigars are drugs or medicine, for the sale of which there was an
exception under the statute, and he charged the jury that if the shop was
kept open to sell cigars, defendant was guilty; conviction affirmed; "The court.
has judicial knowledge of the meaning of common words, and may well rule
that guns and pistols are not drugs or medicines, and may exclude the opinions of witnesses who offer to testify that they are.... [C]igars sold by a
tobacconist in the ordinary way are not drugs or medicines, within the meaning of those words as used in the statute." The questions to the expert were
immaterial and incompetent).
Missouri: Timson v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 597-98,.
119 S.W. 565, 569 (1909) (action by widow of miner killed by falling rock indefendant's mine; the trial judge judicially noticed that all coal mines generate gas and rejected defendant's evidence that this mine did not; judgment
for plaintiff reversed; "If there is any question about the matter of taking
judicial notice of a fact, the doubt should be solved against the presumption
of such fact, and the parties put upon their proof.... Judicially noticing facts,.
like many presumptions entertained by the courts, is but a rule of evidence;.
and, if the question is a disputable one, or can be disputed, evidence so disputing it is competent and should be admitted. [citing Wigmore with approval]"); Brock v. American Cent. Life Ins. Co., 44 S.W.2d 200, 201-02 (Mo.
App. 1931) (insurer defended action for double indemnity on ground that
death was by "poison," an excepted cause of death; "There was also evidence
that carbon monoxide gas is a poison, and that the death of insured was
caused thereby. The evidence being conflicting, it was proper to submit the
case to the jury. It is insisted the court should take judicial notice that
carbon monoxide gas is a poison. Judicial notice will be taken of scientific
facts generally known, but the fact judicially noticed may be disputed");
Scheufler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 886, 895-96, 169 S.W.2d 359,
365 (1943) (action for attorney's fees under the insurance code; the trial
judge, not the one before whom the prior proceedings transpired, took judicial notice of the prior proceedings in setting the attorney's fee; held, remanded; the trial judge did not consider all of the prior proceedings, and he
did not have sufficient information to know what a reasonable fee for all of
the proceedings should be; 'In any event Mr. Aschemeyer would be entitled
to know upon [896] what basis the court was proceeding and be heard
accordingly. 'Taking judicial notice does not import that the matter is
indisputable. It is not necessarily anything more than a prima facie recognition, leaving the matter still open to controversy....' Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence, p. 308").
Nevada: Ex parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, 147, 80 Pac. 463, 466-67 (1905) (habeas
corpus; defendant had been convicted of working more than eight hours a
day in violation of statute; he attacked the constitutionality of the statute
asserting that his particular job was not dangerous nor injurious to health;
judicial notice taken that "prolonged labor in the employment restricted by
the statute is injurious to the health of the workmen as a class"; "we do not
deem it expedient to allow testimony in particular or exceptional cases to
defeat the constitutionality of the [467] act"). Note that the holding in this
case is not that judicial notice is conclusive, but rather that defendant was
trying to prove an immaterial point.
New Hampshire: Stocker v. Boston & M. R.R., 83 N.H. 401, 405, 143 Atl. 68,
71 (1928) (negligence in train-auto collision; plaintiff, over defendant railroad's objection, was permitted to prove defendant's knowledge of protective
devices, such as automatic warning bells, by evidence that such devices existed
at other crossings on defendant's line; verdict for plaintiff; on ground that
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the evidence, without limiting instruction, might have been misused by the
jury, new trial ordered; dictum: "such evidence might be excluded, since
judicial notice may well be taken of the fact that the railroad has knowledge
of such protective methods ....

It being a matter of common knowledge that

the railroad knows about such things, evidence of its knowledge is unnecessary and cannot be rebutted"); State v. Duranleau, 99 N.H. 30, 32, 104 A.2d
519, 521 (1954) (prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor; defendant disputed that the street was a "public way" as required by
the statute; a certified copy of the city ordinance designating the street as a
public way was provided to the appellate court, but not to the trial court;
after expressly rejecting the Morgan view and approving the Wigmore view
(both in text supra), the court continued: "We reaffirm the right of a
municipal court to take judicial notice of its ordinances but since this right
may have been exercised unfairly to the defendant we set aside the verdict
of guilty in order that he may have an opportunity to dispute the matter
judicially noticed"). The objectionable evidence in the Stocker case, supra,
it should be noted, tended to support rather than disprove the matter of
which judicial notice might be taken.
New Jersey: State v. Cromwell, 6 N.J. Misc. 221, 223, 140 Atl. 429, 430
(1928) (writ of error from conviction of bigamy; defendant claimed that
one of his marriages, performed in New York, was invalid under New York
law; a member of the New York bar was called as an expert and so testified
(apparently to the jury); the court stated that under New Jersey law the
relation would be lawful and that it is presumed that this would be the law
in New York; "An examination of the decisions of the courts of that state,
which we are permitted to judicially notice.. . but confirms that presumption.
.. . Against this the testimony of the member of the New York bar could
not avail to establish the law of that state to the contrary").
New York: People v. French Bottling Works, Inc., 259 N.Y. 4, 8, 180 N.E.
537, 538 (1932) (conviction for violation of Sanitation Code by failing to
indicate on bottle that beverage contained saccharin; the court, in affirming,
referred to dictionaries for definitions and characteristics of "saccharin";
"While these definitions of saccharin are not conclusive on the fact, the
people made out a prima facie case [that the regulation was reasonable] and
the burden of going on passed to defendant to meet the evidence against it.
As it offered no evidence, the conviction was proper."); Valentine v. Valentine, 109 N.Y.S.2d 466, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (declaratory judgment to
have it declared that defendant was not plaintiff's wife because of a
divorce granted in Florida; the issue of fact raised by defendant's denial
was whether defendant had made a general or special appearance in the
Florida proceeding; plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings denied;
"proof of the proceedings before the court in another State and the interpretation to be given to the statutes and common law of that State are factual matters which must be established on a trial. . . Section 344-a of the Civil
Practice Act permitting our courts to take judicial notice of the law of
foreign jurisdictions does not change the situation where there is an issue as
to the law of such foreign court").
North Carolina: Harper Furniture Co. v. Southern Express Co., 144 N.C.
639, 643, 644, 57 S.E. 458, 459, 460 (1907) (judicial notice taken that "14 days
is too long a time for the transportation of freight by express between the
two points-Lenoir, N.C., and Erie, Pa.- and that, prima facie, there has been
actionable negligence in the performance of the contract of carriage"; the
term prima facie imports "that on the facts indicated the plaintiff is entitled
to have his cause submitted to the jury"); Commissioners of Hendersonville
v. Prudden & Co., 180 N.C. 496, 499, 105 S.E. 7, 8-9 (1920) (action to recover
purchase price of municipal bonds; defense that their sale had not been
advertised in a "financial newspaper" as required by law; it was stipulated
that the sale was advertised in an ordinary newspaper and that there was no
"financial newspaper" in the state; held, that the bond issue was invalid; the
court judicially noticed that several newspapers did exist in the state satisfying the statutory description; "the Court is not concluded by the admission
of parties to a controversy, as to conclusions or inferences of law, nor by
admissions of fact when contrary to those of which the court is required to
take judicial notice").
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North Dakota: See N.D. COim ANN. § 31-10-01 (1960) ("No evidence of
any fact of which the courts take judicial notice need be given in any civil
or criminal action or proceeding pending in this state by the party alleging
its existence." [Emphasis added.]) Can any inference, as to rebuttability by
the opponent, be drawn from this language?
Oregon: State v. Kincaid, 133 Ore. 95, 103, 104, 285 Pac. 1105, 1108 (1930)
(violation of a dance-hall license law applicable to a town not "having a
population of 500 people or more"; the 1920 census showed a population in
the town of 442; the defendant offered his own testimony that he, with the
aid of various assistants, had enumerated the population and that on the
date charged the town had more than 500 inhabitants; his testimony excluded
as "but hearsay," but held that "a qualified person who had ascertained the
population" would be received; "Judicial notice would not preclude the
court from establishing the truth").
Pennsylvania: Snyder's Estate, 346 Pa. 615, 618, 31 A.2d 132, 134 (1943)
(appeal from auditing judge's adjudication, confirming an account of a
trustee for a weak-minded person; "The auditing judge properly refused to
permit appellant to read into the record the World War Veterans' Act of
1924 and its amendments . . .These laws are matters of which our courts
will take judicial notice .... As to appellant's contention that he was thereby
deprived of the right to raise a federal question concerning the violation of
these statutes, it is sufficient to say that the record clearly indicates that the
question was raised below in appellant's requests for conclusions of law
and disposed of in the opinion of the court en banc"); Appeal of Albert, 372
Pa. 13, 20-21, 22, 92 A.2d 663, 666, 667 (1952) (discharge of teacher for advocating or participating in un-American or subversive doctrines upheld;
judicial notice taken that the Communist Party-to which there was evidence
that the teacher belonged-advocates violent overthrow, the tribunal refusing
to allow the teacher to present contrary evidence; "it would seem almost an
absurdity of legal procedure to continue to submit to various juries in individual cases a question so readily and authoritatively determinable from the
mere perusal of the writings of the acknowledged founddrs and protagonists
of the Communist movement .... It is true, perhaps, that the presumption
created by the doctrine of judicial notice is not a conclusive one but is subject to rebuttal . . . [quoting Wigmore] . . . . Be that as it may, appellant
could have obtained a hearing de novo in the Court of Common Pleas had
she requested it and could there have asserted her right to present [contrary]
evidence ....Not having done so she is not now in the position to complain").
Puerto Rico: Lluberas v. Hijos, 75 P.R.R. 7, 18-19 (1953) (action for benefits
obtained by defendant from wrongful use of plaintiff's land; trial court took
judicial notice of statistics in a government economic publication to determine
the amount of sugar cane and other products raised on the relevant properties
during the years in question; held, reversed; "The doctrine of judicial notice
was adopted as a shortcut to avoid the necessity for the formal introduction
of evidence in certain cases where there is no real need for the offering of
such evidence.... Wigmore . . . states that . . . the opponent is not barred
from contradicting the matter by evidence, if he believes it disputable ...
[19] For such specific purposes [as in this case] the court could not take
judicial notice ... without giving the parties an opportunity to challenge them
or to explain their contents, nor could it decide the case exclusively on the
basis of such documents .... [I]t was the duty of the lower court to base its
judgment on the evidence submitted by both parties").
South Dakota: Soyland v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 71 S.D. 522, 528, 26
N.W. 2d 696, 699 (1947) (plaintiffs sued and recovered fire insurance on a
dwelling; defendant appealed on ground that the court should judicially
notice that the policy was nullified because of an increase in the "moral
hazard" in that the value of the house had been drastically reduced by sale
of the land on which it stood; judicial notice refused; semble: 'qt is not
permissible for the court to take judicial knowledge of a fact that may be
disputed by competent evidence").
Utah: State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 97, 262 Pac. 987, 989 '(1927) (action by
state against owner of land adjacent to receding lake to quiet title to strip
of land formerly underlying edge of the lake; the state alleged that the lake
was navigable and that it held title'to the land; defendant demurred; the
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supreme court took judicial notice that title to lands underlying navigable
waters is vested in the state subject only to Congress' power to control the
waters for interstate and foreign commerce; "Such allegations of source of
title, being rather a statement of a legal conclusion, would not be admitted
by general demurrer, if the conclusion, as matter of law, were erroneous.
But this court will judicially know what the law is in that respect. And what
is judicially known may not be controverted by pleadings, or made issuable
by them"); State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 328, 234 P.2d 600, 602 (1951)
(prosecution for grand larceny; trial judge instructed jury that, though no
evidence had been offered on the matter, it must take the value of the relatively new automobile, which defendant allegedly stole, to be worth more
than the $50 minimum for grand larceny; reversed on appeal; the court distinguished the "judicial knowledge" of matters required by statute [now
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-1 (1953)]J, which are conclusive on the jury pursuant
to statute [now UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-21-3 (1953)], and "judicial notice" of
matters commonly known, which are not conclusive; "The taking of judicial
notice of this latter class of commonly known evidentiary facts does not
establish them so conclusively as to prevent the presentation of contrary evidence or the making of a finding to the contrary"; Wigmore quoted with
approval). The statute last cited supra is discussed at the end of this footnote.
Washington: State ex rel. Huff v. Reeves, 5 Wash. 2d 637, 643, 106 P.2d 729,
732 (1940) (mandamus to compel secretary of state to certify Communist Party
nominees for public offices; court refused to take judicial notice that the
Communist Party advocates violent overthrow because counsel for relators
denied it, and because there was a statutory procedure provided to determine
the fact; "the issue should be presented, upon competent evidence, to a jury
for determination").
Wisconsin: State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Norcross, 132 Wis. 534, 544, 112
N.W. 40, 43 (1907) (quo warranto by attorney-general to declare void a franchise to build a dam across the Rock river; defendant demurred on ground
that, although the complaint alleged that the river was navigable, it was not
navigable and that therefore there was no interest for the attorney-general
to protect and the complaint stated no cause of action; the trial judge judicially noticed that the river was not navigable and sustained the demurrer;
held, reversed; "it cannot be held ... that the question of the nonnavigability
of Rock river for any public purpose, or any kind of navigation at all points
on the river, and for all time, is such a matter of judicial knowledge that the
state will not be heard to aver or offer evidence to the contrary [quoting
Wigmore with approval]").
ENGLAND: Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213, 223, 57 Eng. Rep. 769, 772
(1828) (bill for discovery preparatory to an action to recover installments
paid on obligations of the government of the Federal Republic of Central
America; the bill alleged that defendant represented itself to be agent for
the republic, which was "a Sovereign and Independent State, recognized and
treated as such by His Majesty the King of these Realms"; after communicating with the foreign office and learning that the republic had not been
recognized, discovery denied; "It appears to me that, without saying how far
the Plaintiff might have had the discovery which he asks, provided he had
represented his case otherwise, yet, if he makes this fact the foundation of
his Case, that this is an Independent Government, recognized by the Government of this Country, when it is not so, I must judicially take notice of what
is the truth of the fact, notwithstanding the Averment on the Record, because
nothing is taken to be true except that which is properly pleaded: and I am
of opinion that, when you plead that which is historically false, and which
the Judges are bound to take notice of as being false, it cannot be said you
have properly pleaded, merely because it is averred, in plain terms; and
that I must take it just as if there was no such averment on the Record");
Davey v. Harrow Corp., [1957] 2 Weekly L.R. 941, 944, [1957] 2 All E.R. 305,
307 (action for damages caused to plaintiff's house by roots of defendant's
trees; trial judge gave judgment for defendant, finding that the offending
trees were on plaintiff's side of the property line; reversed; on re-examination of the evidence and on the basis of further information, held that the
trees were on defendant's land; with reference to the "Ordnance Survey," the
court said that "the evidence of an official from the Ordnance Survey Office,
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JUDICIAL NOTICE

Proper resolution of the doctrinal dispute depends primarily on
what role judicial notice (of adjudicative facts) is expected to play.
All experts conceive of judicial notice as serving a time-saving function. But according to the Wigmore-Thayer view, that is its only
function. The result of this philosophy is that judicial notice is conceived of as a useful tool for dealing not only with patently indisputable matters, but also with matters to some extent disputable. It is
conceived of as a method of allocating some burden of challenge or
proof (production or persuasion?) to the party which would not ordinarily have it. This would be done, presumably, whenever it appears
to the judge (from formal evidence?) not that the matter is patently
true, but only that the probabilities sufficiently support the proposition
that it is expedient to assume the truth of the matter in the absence
of declared resistance or of countervailing evidence. It is probable,
therefore, that the Wignore-Thayer view disagrees with the Morgan
view on the conclusiveness of judicial notice only because it includes
within its concept of judicial notice not only patently indisputable
matters, to which Morgan would restrict the principle, but also matters somewhat disputable but unlikely to be disputed. If such a pre.sumption-like device is to exist and if the term "judicial notice" is to
be applied to it, then it follows that the opponent, in fairness, must
given before us, but not in the court below, was that the line indicated the
centre of the existing hedge. This is in accordance with the invariable practice
of the survey as was proved in Fisher v. Winch (1) ([1939] 2 All E.R. 144),
and in our opinion, after that case and this, courts in the future can take
notice of this practice of the Ordnance Survey as at least prima facie evidence
-ofwhat a line on the map indicates").
There are a few statutes which add to the confusion. In Alaska, California
and Utah, for example, there are statutes which read as follows (California
version): "Questions of law addressed to the court. All questions of law,
including the admissibility of testimony, the facts preliminary to such admission, and the construction of statutes and other writings, and other rules of
evidence, are to be decided by the court, and all discussions of law addressed:
to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is, by this code, made evidence
of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the jury, who are bound
to accept it." ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 66-13-62 (1949); CAL. CODE Civ.
PRoc. § 2102 (Deering 1953); UTAH CODE ANx. § 78-21-3 (1953). All three of

these states have adjacent sections providing as follows (California version):
"All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those mentioned
in the next section [above quoted], are to be decided by the jury, and all
evidence thereon is to be addressed to them, except when otherwise provided

by this code." ALASKA CoMr. LAWS ANN. § 66-13-63 (1949); CAL. CODE Civ.
PROC. § 2101 (Deering 1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-21-2 (1953). These statutes, enacted in California, for example, in 1872, are quite obviously addressed
to the broad question of who (judge or jury) decides a question rather than
to the additional narrower question of how (by evidence or judicial notice)

the information is obtained. Indeed, these pairs of statutes-but for the
presence of other statutes specifically authorizing judicial notice--could be
read to preclude entirely judicial notice of the typical indisputable adjudicative fact. In any event, as can be seen in People v. Mayes (Cal.), .supra,
and in State v. Lawrence (Utah), supra, the "bound to accept" statutes quoted
above have been held or said to be applicable when judicial notice is taken of:
certain adjudicative facts.
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be allowed to demand evidence or at least to introduce rebutting evidence. Ergo, "judicial notice" is "rebuttable." The reasons for rejecting this Wigmore-Thayer view are expressed supra § 2565, paragraph
I1(a).
If judicial notice of adjudicative facts is limited to matters patently
true, then it is clear that the result, albeit for different reasons, should
be the same for adjudicative facts as for legislative facts. The party
opposing judicial notice should not have the right to combat the
judge's determination by introducing formal evidence of the matter
to the trier of fact.4 That is, judicial notice should be "conclusive."
There should be no misunderstanding. To declare that "evidence"
will be rejected is not to say the "information" will not be received to
guide the judge in determining if judicial notice is or was proper.
(Indeed, it may be error for him to fail to receive it.) It is solely to
say that one of the reasons for judicial notice in the area of adjudicative fact--viz., that it is inappropriate for a fact to be found patently
wrong-requires that a party not be permitted to dissuade the jury
from the indisputable truth and that a judge (if there is no jury) not
be bound by the formal evidence to find a fact contrary to what
informal investigation discloses is the indisputable truth.
4. Differences between the Wigmore-Thayer and Morgan views are not so

obvious where the fact is in any event to be decided by the judge rather than
by the jury. This situation would exist either where there is a jury, but the
fact is one of those reserved to the judge (see §§ 2549-59 supra), or where
there is no jury and all facts are determined by the judge. As to such facts,
the efforts by the prejudiced party to dissuade the judge qua judge by informal information that judicial notice is inappropriate or that notice has been
wrongly taken (entirely permissible under the Morgan view) may be difficult
to distinguish from efforts by the party directed to the judge qua trier of fact
by formal evidence to rebut the noticed fact (as Wigmore and Thayer would
have it). Indeed, in administrative agencies, where an analogous no-jury
situation exists, no distinction is drawn (see discussion of Administrative
Procedure Act § 7(d) in note 3 supra at 798). In courts, however, the
distinction would seem to be necessary despite the absence of a jury. The
questions as to who has the burdens, as to the formality of proof, and as to
the freedom of the judge to resort to extra-record sources for illumination
could be (but are not as likely to be) as crucial in a non-jury as in a
jury trial.

